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Overview of Electric Industry Bypass
Issues
Monopoly in the electric utility industry is so taken for granted
today that it is almost forgotten that competition ever existed, or that
elements of competition presently exist in the industry. Nevertheless, direct
competition has existed at all levels of the industry from its very start. Such
competition continues in one form or another to this very day. A complete
understanding of competition and/or bypass i issues in the electric industry
requires an overview of the historical, economic, legal and regulatory forces
under.which the industry has developed and presently operates.
In its mature form the electric industry has three functions:
generation of power, transmission of power and distribution of power. In
many cases today all of these functions are provided by a single, vertically
integrated investor-owned utility (IOU) or municipal utility system (Muni).
But that need not be the case and it wasn't always so. There have been, and
still are, entities that provide only some of these functions. The consumers
of electricity initially provided these functions for themselves. Generation
of power was accomplished through the use of a small dynamo, which was
turned by water power or steam or an internal combustion engine. The
electricity generated was consumed on site: to light an individual building
or turn a motor. And the transmission and distribution of this electricity
was simply accomplished by a wire connecting the generator to the load, or
ultimate use of the power. But, of course, as the need for electricity grew,
individual consumers lacked the ability (or will) to generate the power they
needed, and the electric industry was born.
A LITrLE HISTORY

We have a little over 100 years of experience with electricity as an
industry. The first central station for the generation of electricity (that is,
where the electricity was generated at a location remote from the load) was
demonstrated by Thomas Edison in New York City in 1882. Edison
Appreciation is expressed to the sponsors of this symposium, the University of New
Mexico School of Law, Dean Leo Romero and Professor Suedeen Kelly, for making this
*

opportunity to exchange views on these important national issues available to the participants.
The opinions expressed herein are my own and not those of my firm or any of its clients.

1. The term bypass is used to describe those instances where a new supplier either builds
or acquires the facilities necessary to circumvent some or all of the facilities installed by an
incumbent supplier.
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perfected the incandescent light bulb, but lacked a market for his invention.
Necessity, they say is the mother (or father) of invention. Edison conceived
of the large central power station that would distribute electricity through
lines to customers for his light bulbs. He picked an area in downtown New
York City for a demonstration and, on September 4, 1882, his Pearl Street
Station went into business to serve 85 customers with 400 lamps.
Growth was slow. By the end of 1883, only two cities had a central
power station. The industry was then almost equally divided between
municipally sponsored systems (essentially street lighting) and IOUs, in
which investors put up the capital and took the risk that this new enterprise
would be profitable. Interestingly, the isolated power plant and light
distribution system appears initially to have been more attractive to small
towns and cities-those that did not have gas light.2 The vestiges of some
of those early systems continue to the present day as small municipal
systems.
SOME ECONOMICS
Over time, the industry pursued economies of scale, as larger
entities absorbed many of the isolated power plants and small distribution
networks. Generally, the acquiring companies were able to offer lower costs
due to economies of scale. For example, bigger generators consumed less
fuel per unit or the IOU was able to assemble a more diverse load because
serving peak requirements is more expensive than serving at average loads.
In addition, these companies were better able to raise the capital necessary
for system expansion, were not constrained by municipal boundaries or
debt limitations, or-because of their diverse customer base and
equipment-were able to offer reliability that could not be economically
achieved by isolated power plants or smaller systems. However, large
customers have always had the ability to produce their own power ("on-site
generation"), and municipalities have always retained the ability to choose
whether to provide their own electric service or to permit an IOU to provide
service within their boundaries. The decision has been governed primarily
by economics and, in later years, economics supplemented by legislation
and regulatory policy. The most important factor influencing the decision,
however, is that the electric industry is the most capital intensive of modem
industries. The significant capital investment in generation, transmission
and distribution requires a long-term commitment which is more easily
2. Similarly, it was common practice in the early part of this century for large complexes
(e.g., universities, hospitals, resort hotels) to install their own generating, transmission and
distribution plant to serve one or more contiguous buildings on their own property. See, e.g.,
The Ostego FarmerVol. XXII, No. 32 (July 16,1909) (installation of a power house to serve the
Otesaga Hotel in Cooperstown, New York).
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made by a large, stable entity. Thus, as this industry grew, in the early and
it was increasingly dominated by large entities, principally
mid-1900s,
3
IOUs.
But the economics of the electric industry are capable of change, in
response to technological improvements and regulatory initiatives. I can
illustrate this point with some personal anecdotes. My undergraduate major
was chemical engineering. I enrolled in engineering school at Columbia
University in 1965. Columbia had only recently retired a coal burning
power plant that had, since approximately 1900, provided the entire electric
and steam heating service to its campus on Morningside Heights in New
York City. The cost of maintaining and expanding the old plant and its, by
then, ancient distribution system, exceeded the cost of service from the local
utility: Con Edison. Columbia retired the old coal-fired steam boilers and
turbine generators and took retail service from Con Edison. Thirty years
later, as much due to economics as to the consequences of the federal Public
Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 ("PURPA"),' much of the electric
power and steam consumed by Columbia is today produced by a modem,
gas-fired cogeneration plant owned by Columbia, and that plant is a net
seller of power to the Con Edison system. Thus, we see a pattern that might
be taken as a microcosm of how economics have affected the electric
industry over the decades: as the IOU increased its efficiency, it replaced
service from Columbia's independent source with its own power; however,
when legislation later made independent power both equally reliable and
more economical to large consumers, Columbia found it to its advantage to
return to independent power production.
The following events at a large eastern IOU illustrate the effects of
the long-term commitment of capital and of the changing economics of the
industry. This company, predominantly dependent on coal-fired power
plants (and subject to intense political pressures to bum coal), attempted to
diversify its fuel sources by constructing two 820 Megawatt (MW) oil-fired

3. By the 1990s IOUs supplied 75% of the nation's power. LEONARDS. HYMAN, AMERICA'S
ELEC nUTuMs: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 157 (1994). IOUs became the primary vehicle for
providing electric power for both political and economic reasons. Politically, the growth of the
public power sector decreased after the New Deal. And economically, IOUs were able to keep
up with demand as well as increase operating efficiencies, and thus continued to expand.
4.

Pub. L No. 95-617,92 Stat. 3117 (codified in U.S.C. Sections 15,16,26,30,42 and 43).

To achieve the objective of reducing American dependence on fossil fuels by promoting
increased energy efficiency Congress sought to eliminate two significant barriers to the

development of alternative energy sources: (1) the reluctance of traditional electric utilities to
purchase power from and sell back-up or standby power to non-traditional facilities, and (2)
the financial burdens imposed on alternative energy sources by state and federal regulatory
authorities. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750-51 (1982).
As will be discussed below, under PURPA, certain independent power producers may require
utilities to purchase power from them.
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generators adjacent to existing coal-fired generation in the early 1970s. The

units came on line successively in 1975 and 1977, and in 1978 achieved a
capacity factor of 45 percent. that is, the total generation from the two plants
during that year was equal to 45 percent of the power that could have been
generated had they been on line 100 percent of the time.
Ishould put the capacity factor of generation in some perspective.
A 45 percent capacity factor isn't bad. Generation units can't run all the
time: there must be some down time for maintenance. And customers don't
consume the same amount of electricity every hour throughout the year.
There are peaks (summer afternoon air conditioning loads) and valleys (3:00
in the morning). If power is to be available when the customer flips his light
switch (which is the nominal expectation), the generation capacity installed

or committed to a particular system must be significantly higher than the
average use.! Through power pools, IOUs and Munis call upon each others'
capacities at times in order to limit their total commitments to generation.
By 1992, the capacity factor for the two plants, built in 1975 and
1977, had declined to merely seven percent. The principal reason for this
decline was that these particular plants, as compared to others within a
three-state region, were no longer being run as frequently by the regional
power pool either because (1) other units had become more economical to
run or, perhaps more important, (2) new units had come on line that, could,
under PURPA, require the utility to purchase power from them. The power
purchased by the IOU from these independent producers, pursuant to the
PURPA requirement, of course replaced power that would otherwise have
been produced by the two generators the IOU had recently constructed.
While the IOU had to maintain these new generators, in order to meet its
peak demand, the perhaps unintended consequence of PURPA was to
reduce the annual output from these stations.
Now that utility isn't presently losing any money. The cost of
constructing these two new generators remains in the utility's rate base, and
thus continues to be passed on to the utility's customers in their electricity
rates. But, because the high fixed costs remain constant no matter how little
power is produced by these generators, the utility's average cost to generate
power has risen. And, the average cost of power from those generating
stations is now more expensive than many alternative sources of power.
My friend, Dr. John O'Brien, President of Wheeled Electric Power,
with whom I often disagree, has been quoted in the trade press as stating
that the power generated from a new, natural gas-fired, combined-cycle

5.

Thus, the criticism of some, such as Roger Gale of the Washington International Energy

Group, that the electric industry uses, on average, only 50 to 60 percent of its capacity in a
given year is misplaced. See Electricity Daily, Vol. 5, no. 108 (Dec. 5,1995).
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power plant is presently available at 3C per kwh. The retail power rates of
New York State IOUs are currently between 10€-15€ per kwh. The average
cost of power generated from the older, oil and gas-fired power plants of
our IOUs is in excess of 4 per kwh.7
The economists in the audience, I'm sure, will observe that my
example is inconsistent. It mixes Dr. O'Brien's estimate of a competitive
market price with regulated prices based on average embedded costs.
Nevertheless, the fact that law or regulation may give some sellers the
opportunity to run their power plants under their most efficient conditions
(because that is how Dr. O'Brien calculates his cost of production), while
others, such as IOUs, function under an obligation to construct and operate
facilities to serve even unprofitable loads (and thus may be forced to operate
their facilities under less than optimal conditions), has little to do with the true
economics of serving electric utility customers. The inequality between the
obligations imposed on IOUs and the relative freedom of other producers to
generate and sell power at wholesale, created by the vagaries of law, is simply
an economic fact of life with which each type of producer of electricity lives.
Such an inequity does preclude direct comparison between those
who must stand ready to serve and those who do not operate under a
similar burden, however. In order to keep power flowing through their
transmission and distribution networks, utilities (whether IOUs or Munis)
must either physically maintain sufficient excess generating capacity, or
have a contract providing for excess capacity in active (spinning) and
inactive (standby) reserve to meet changes in customer loads and to
anticipate contingencies such as the breakdown of one of the operating
generating units or a fault on a transmission line. Of course, the cost of
power from that generation on a cent per kwh basis would be astronomical.
It is a little like idling your car. Your fuel mileage is abominable when
idling, because the engine runs and bums gasoline though you aren't
moving. But, of course, when sitting at a stop light or stuck in traffic you
don't turn off your engine.8 In the electric industry we don't call it idling,
we characterize it as an "ancillary service."' You can't receive power

6. Independent Power Report, Dec. 15,1995, at 6.
7. Id.
8. Similarly, if you use your car only for short trips on weekends, the cost per mile of
operating your car (the cost of lease payments, insurance, fuel, and maintenance divided by the

number of miles driven) will be higher than the cost per mile if the same vehicle had been
driven 5060 miles per day, five days per week.
9. Ancillary services are those services necessary to support the transmission of electric
power from seller to purchaser given the obligations of control areas and transmitting utilities

within those control areas to maintain reliable operation of the interconnected transmission
system. These services include scheduling and dispatch services, load following, line loss
compensation, reactive power and voltage control.
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without paying for the ancillary services; or, if you have accomplished that
feat, someone else is paying for the cost of the ancillary services that
support your load. Given the different regulations under which various
segments of the electric industry operate, it is natural that differentials in
the cost of producing power arise. It is simply inappropriate to judge power
producers solely on the basis of the average cost of the power they generate.
These anecdotes are intended to illustrate only some of the
economic consequences of legal and technological changes which affect the
electric industry. While IOUs have responded successfully to many of these
changes in the past, as witnessed by their dominance of the market today,
their continuing ability to do so is unclear.
A LITTLE POLITICS AND A LITTLE LAW
Having laid out some of the basic economic factors of utility service,
I'll address the political and legal components. Whether electric service in
a given area will be provided by an IOU or by a municipal agency is
essentially a political question. In order to organize an IOU you need to first
acquire a franchise from a particular municipality in order to use the streets,
string wires and operate in that municipality. In most states, the
municipality authorized to issue such franchises is also authorized by law
to provide utility service to its own residents as a municipal service.
Authorization to establish and provide electricity as a municipal service
usually requires that the municipal governing body seek and obtain an
affirmative vote of the municipality's electorate.
The rates charged by a municipal utility are generally free from
regulatory oversight by the State's public service commission. Of course,
those rates (like the rates charged by an IOU) must recover the cost of
providing service (generating or purchasing power, maintaining wires,
transformers, and other equipment, and reading meters and billing) and
providing a return sufficient to attract capital.1' In some cases, the initial
provision or subsequent expansions of municipal utility service may be
constrained by the amount of debt that the municipality is lawfully
permitted to incur.
It is fair to say that there has always been competition-between
IOUs and Munis-for each other's retailbusiness. Historically, questions of
economics, efficiency, and legal costs related to building or acquiring a
utility system have governed whether a municipality will choose to provide

10. Although the municipality is free of regulatory oversight, bond covenants typically
require that the rates a Muni charges must produce sufficient revenue to service their debt.
This, as discussed later, could require an immediate, large increase should a Muni lose a large
industrial or commercial customer.
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a service presently provided to its inhabitants by an IOU. Interestingly,
although there appears to be an abundance of discussion about
municipalization, it is mostly talk and feasibility reports that are not acted
upon. There have been virtually no successful municipalization efforts since
1991. Between 1980 and 1991, 31 new local, publicly owned electric
utilities commenced operations. During roughly the same period, 56 local,
publicly owned electric utilities were sold, 39 to IOUs. 2 In virtually all of
those cases, the systems were small-under 10,000 meters. The most likely
current candidates for municipalization efforts thus appear to be small
municipalities with one or more large industrial customers who favor
municipalization for their own pecuniary advantage, and cities that plan to
offer municipal service only in targeted areas. Both of these scenarios
appear to be subterfuges for something called "retail wheeling," a subject
that I will address later.
While retail electric sales are particularly a matter of state
jurisdiction, wholesale power sales are exclusively subject to federal
jurisdiction. The reason for this bifurcation relates to constitutional law.
Those of you who have studied constitutional law or theory will recall that
the United States Constitution contains a clause giving Congress the power
to regulate commerce among the several states. A judicial doctrine (called
the "negative commerce clause") developed in the late 19th and early 20th
century: to wit, since the Constitution had granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the states, in some circumstances the states were
precluded from regulating transactions in interstate commerce even if
Congresshad passed no laws governing such transactions!
At the same time that the negative commerce clause analysis was
gaining momentum, the developing electric distribution and transmission
industry was beginning, in search of economies of scale and scope, to
extend its wires further and further from the city or town centers and
original central generating stations. In some respects this push to larger
systems is what differentiated the IOUs of that time period from the Munis,

11. There appear to have been one or two small municipalizations in Alaska and, in April
1994, Broken Bow, Oklahoma established a public works authority which resells power
purchased from an REA cooperative to a single industrial customer. Broken Bow is not really
a Muni because it owns no facilities and an IOU continues to serve the inhabitants inside its
own municipal limits. Similarly, the 1995 purchase of the 2,200 meter privately owned Bozrah
Light & Power Company by the Groton (Ct.) Department of Public Utilities is not a true
municipalization effort. The owner of the privately held utility was retiring and wanted to sell
the utility. Groton acquired the utility, pursuant to special state legislation, in order to expand
its service territory outside its municipal boundaries in order to offset load losses from its
shrinking defense-related customer base.
12. American Public Power Assn., "Public Power in America: A History" at 7.
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which were more likely
to restrict their activities to their municipal
13
corporate boundaries.
These two trends combined in 1927 to create this bifurcation
between federal jurisdiction over wholesale and state jurisdiction over retail
transactions. In that year, the Supreme Court, relying on the negative
commerce clause analysis, held that the states of Rhode Island and
Massachusetts lacked the authority to regulate the rates for interstate
wholesale sales of electricity among utilities for resale.' Thus, there was a
clear gap in regulation: while the states could regulate the retail intrastate
activities of the IOUs, they could not regulate their interstate transmission
of electricity. Consequently, there was no regulation of the rates at which
electricity was sold at wholesale among IOUs, Munis, or other entities.
The 1935 enactment of the Federal Power Act ("FPA") was a direct
response to the "regulatory gap" created by the Attleboro case. The FPA
delegated to a new agency, the Federal Power Commission (now the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC), the exclusive authority
to regulate the rates for the transmission and sale at wholesale of electric
energy in interstate commerce.' The exclusivity provision means that there
are two separate schemes for determining power costs: retail power costs
are set by either a state regulatory commission for an IOU or by the
municipal legislative body for a Muni; and wholesale power and/or
transmission rates are set by the FERC for wholesale transmission
transactions by either IOUs or Munis.16

13. In many states, when a Muni provides service outside its corporate boundaries the
rates for such service are regulated by the state public utility commission just like the IOU. This
protection, for those ratepayers who are not voters within the municipality, removes a certain
element of local control And, potentially, it sets up a conflict between ratepayers and taxpayers
with public advocates often arguing before the PUC that utility rates (for non-taxpayers)
should be lower and should not subsidize taxpayers. This is often alone reason sufficient for
the Muni to restrict its service to within its own corporate limits.
14. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
15. Section 201(b) of the FPA- provides that the FERC has jurisdiction over "the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce" and "over all facilities for such
transmission." 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). That jurisdiction is exclusive because, as Justice Scalia
observes in Mississippi Power &Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354,377 (1988)," if FERC has
jurisdiction over a subject, the states cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject."
16. The predominance of large, vertically integrated public utilities in the electric industry,
combining generation, transmission and distribution functions under a single corporate entity
whose retail sales are subject to the jurisdiction of one or more state utility commissions and
whose wholesale sales and transmission are subject to federal regulation, was in large part
encouraged by the enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA").
15 U.S.C. §79 et. seq. In order to protect the public from some of the abusive practices of
holding companies, PUHCA limits common ownership to a single integrated public-utility
system "consisting of one or more units of generating plants and/or transmission lines and/or
distributing facilities... physically interconnected or capable of physical interconnection and
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Congress, however, did not create a totally comprehensive scheme
of regulation. It filled a gap--the inability of the states to regulate the price
of interstate power transactions. However, Congress gave the FPC power
to regulate only voluntary commercial relationships, not to directly control
interstate relationships. The FPC could not compel an electric utility to
engage in wholesale transactions, even in the public interest.
This was the state of affairs until 1978. In that year, in response to
events which followed the 1973 Arab oil embargo, Congress passed
PURPA. To make the nation more energy independent, the Congress
decided to encourage certain types of electric power production facilities
(most notably, cogeneration plants and plants that were fueled by waste
materials or renewable sources). Utilities were required to purchase power
produced by qualifying facilities ("QFs") at their own avoided cost and to
provide access to their transmission facilities for those QFs that wished to
"wheel" their power to an adjoining utility (where, presumably, the
avoided cost was greater than the total of the avoided cost of the first utility
plus the cost of transmission).17
Congress selected avoided cost as the measure of the value of QF
power because it was believed that purchases at this price would not raise
the cost to the utility's ratepayers."5 Under PURPA, the contract rates for a
utility's wholesale purchases from QFs were determined pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the FERC, but were implemented by state
utility commissions. One FERC regulation provided that, to encourage the
devel-opment and financing of QFs, the QF was entitled to a long-term
contract.19 Contracts of 10-15 year duration became common. The pricing
terms incorporated levelized annual charges based on, in many cases, the
regulator's estimate of the utility's long run avoided costs ("LRACs") over
the same period. The goal was to match the debt service requirements for
the financing of the QF project, since the sole financial resource of the QF

which under normal conditions may be economically operated as a single interconnected and
coordinated system." 15 U.S.C. §79(b)(29).
17. Wheeling is the transmission of power over the electric system of an electric utility that
did not generate the power. See, e.g., Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057,1059
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
18. See American Paper Institute, Inc., v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 461 US.
402(1983).
19. 18 C.F.R. 292.304(d).
20. Because a utility's estimate of its avoided costs are likely to vary over the life of a
contract, QFs often want to "levelize" payments-receive equal payments over the life of the
contract-where the total amount paid under the contract is equal to the utility's total avoided
cost during the contract's term.
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was the payments
it would receive from the utility for the power it
21
produced.
Much has been written concerning the economics of the QF
contracts and the current oversupply of relatively high-priced power. I will
not attempt to add to that literature. Nevertheless, in retrospect (that is,
with 20-20 hindsight), it is easy to see how the price of power under these
contracts (based on LRACs), and which the utilities are compelled to buy
pursuant to PURPA, could exceed the marginal cost of power production
in the short term even with the most accurate of long term forecasts. The
consequence is that many utilities are today committed to buy power under
these contracts at high prices even though power at much lower prices
(sometimes from their own generation facilities) is available on the market.'
Further, because there currently is an over supply of power, many
electricity users want to see the scope of FERC's authority to "order" access
to transmission expanded so that they might gain access to cheaper power
available on the wholesale market.
Now, to the same extent that nature abhors a vacuum and attempts
to fill it, anytime there are potentially two prices for the same commodity
there will be those who will attempt to gain access to the lower price.
PURPA created a wholesale market for power generated by independent
power producers. It specifically left to the states the ability to regulate retail
sales of power produced by qualifying facilities.' As regulators realized
that the initial PURPA contracts had become too expensive they revised
their avoided cost estimates downward. Opportunities to sell power at
wholesale dwindled. Consequently, the independent power segment of the
market sought new customers and clamored for increased transmission
system access to reach those markets. Further, what is today touted as
competition in the electric industry often involves attempts by those who
are clearly retail customers to gain unwarranted access to lower, wholesale
power and prices.
Enter the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("EPAct" or "Act"), 24 which
broadened the conditions under which the FERC may authorize wheeling

21. See Utah Power & Light Co., PacificCorp and PC/UP&L Merging Corp., 57 FERC [
61,363(1991).

22. In one recent case, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation alleged that a contract with
an independent power producer, pursuant to PURPA and state law, obligated it to pay 6¢ per
kWh, well above its then incremental production cost of 2.3c kWh. In re Megan-Racine
Associates, Inc., Dkt. No. 96-CV-292,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4225, *2 (N.D. N.Y. April 1,1996).
23. Section 210(a) of PURPA states that the FERC "may not authorize a qualifying
cogeneration facility ...to make any sale for purposes other than resale." See PRI Energy
Systems, Inc., 26 FERC 1 61,177 (1984).
24. Pub. L. No. 102-485,106 Stat. 2776 (1992), codified at, among other places, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79z-5(a) and 16 U.S.C. §§796 (22-25), 824-j; 824-k).
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transactions. Section 211 of the FPA was amended to give the FERC clear
authority to order wholesale wheeling for certain classes of entities and
transactions. Congress wanted to ensure that generators of wholesale power
could get transmission access to sell that power to other wholesalers. The
EPAct thus provides that upon the request of any electric utility, federal
power marketing agency, or any other entity generating power, the FERC
may order the transmitting utility to provide transmission services
including, if necessary, an increase in transmission capacity. Section 212 of
the FPA was also amended, to make clear that FERC had no power to order
retail wheeling, that is transmission directly to or for the benefit of ultimate
consumers. Section 212, as amended, limits wheeling directly to or for the
direct benefit of ultimate consumers unless the entity seeking the
transmission order was providing service to the ultimate consumer on
October 24, 1992 (the effective date of the Act) or the entity would utilize
transmission or distribution facilities that it owns or controls to deliver all
such electric energy to the ultimate consumer.' The EPAct dearly identifies
retail wheeling as a matter of state concern. Retail electric distribution, after
all, has always been subject to state jurisdiction-whether such jurisdiction
applied to IOUs or Munis.
The EPAct thus began to open the wholesale market to competition.
Simultaneously, the electric industry began to undergo restructuring. FERC
Order No. 888, pursuant to which public utilities here filed open access
tariffs to facilitate transmission transactions, 6 answers only some of the
questions raised by the restructuring of the electric industry. While Order
No. 888 sets standards for wholesale transmission pricing, retail access will
be more complex. Every retail transaction will, of necessity, include a
wholesale transmission component. But, as will be addressed by other
speakers, the dividing line between the transmission facilities of IOUs,
which are FERC jurisdictional, and the IOUs' distribution facilities, which
are subject to state jurisdiction, is not clear.27

25. Section 212, as amended, limits wheeling directly to or for the direct benefit of ultimate
consumer unless the entity seeking the transmission order was providing service to the ultimate
consumer on the effective date of the Act (October 24, 1992) or the entity would utilize
transmission or distribution facilities that it owns or controls to deliver all such electric energy
to the ultimate Consumer. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824k(h).
26. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-DiscriminatoryTransmission
Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilitiesand Transmitting Utilities,
[1991-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 31,036 (April 24,1996)
("OrderNo. 888").
27. In this respect, the structure of the electric industry is quite different from the natural
gas industry. In the natural gas industry, separate entities perform the transmission and
distribution functions and thus there is a clear distinction in jurisdiction over transmission
(which is provided by natural gas pipeline companies that are regulated at the federal level)
and distribution (provided by local distribution companies regulated by state utility
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In Order No. 888, moreover, the FERC acknowledges that the wide
range of jurisdictional interpretations and proposals in the comments to its
notice of proposed rulemaking reflects the fact that the legislative history
of the FPA and the case law interpreting federal/state jurisdiction under
that Act and the Natural Gas Act "grew out of a market structure where
electricity and transmission generally were bought and sold on a bundled
basis." ' That would not be the case with unbundled retail access. While the
jurisdictional lines may be unclear, whether facilities are used in
transmission or local distribution is a question of fact to be decided by the
FERC as a matter of its exclusive jurisdiction.2 9
Electric generation and transmission facilities traditionally have
been installed by the electric service provider (whether a Muni or an IOU)
in an integrated fashion in order to achieve an efficient, least-cost power
supply, operating together as a single system for the benefit of all
customers.'"It will be a difficult task to agree on the unbundling of these
components and the division between FERC jurisdictional and state
jurisdictional facilities for setting rates.
This said, I return to the issue of municipalization or bypass. Some
commentators have suggested that a route for large industrial consumers
to obtain access to cheaper, wholesale power is to encourage
municipalization. The standard scenario is that a large industrial customer,
prevented from obtaining less expensive power due to the ban on retail
wheeling at the federal level, will encourage its municipality to get into the
utility business. The new municipal utility would ostensibly be eligible to
seek a transmission order and thus be able to shop around for less
expensive power to meet the needs of not only the industrial customer, but
also of other city residents.
This municipalization scenario is not without risk. We don't know
the extent of the distribution and transmission facilities that a new Muni

commissions). See OrderNo. 888,11991-1996 Transfer Binder) Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep.
(CCH) 31,036, at 31,780-31,785.
28. Id. at 31,780. Sales on a "bundled" basis occur when the costs associated with the
individual components of service-generation, transmission, distribution, and other ancillary
services-are not calculated separately. Instead, a single cost for the entire service is calculated.
Thus, costs are "unbundled" when the cost of providing one component of service is calculated
separately from the cost of others. See id.
29. See, e.g., FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205,210 (1964), Connecticut
Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515,529 (1945) ("Federal jurisdiction [follows) the flow of
electrical energy, an engineering and scientific, rather then a legalistic or governental, test.").
FERC has stated, though, that it will give deference to state decisions over what constitutes
transmission and what constitutes distribution 1f such decisions follow the criteria set out in
Order 888. OrderNo. 888, [1991-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
31,036, at 31,781.
30. See, e.g. Maine Public Service Co. v. FERC, 964 F.2d 5 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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must own or control before being entitled to a wheeling order. The
traditional view was that a municipality's purchases were wholesale
transactions subject to the FPA when the municipality owned and operated
an extensive electrical distribution system to convey and meter the
electricity purchases?' There is no reason to believe that this was changed
by the EPAct. Nor do we know the extent to which an existing Muni would
be at risk of losing its own customers when true retail access becomes
available.' However, we do know that the customer of a Muni, because its
facilities typically are financed one hundred percent by debt, would be at
greater risk of a large rate increase to make up the resulting shortfall in
revenue necessary to cover the debt service on its bonds than would be the
customers of an IOU which combines both debt and equity in its financing
portfolio. We also don't know the compensation (i.e. "stranded costs") that
may be due the former supplier for facilities rendered surplus as a result of
the costs that would be stranded if a large customer of a Muni opts for retail
access. At least four such bypass cases are before the FERC: Suffolk
County, Palm Springs, Freedom Electric and Praxair/Modesto, each
representing a somewhat different view on the question.'
In the next two days we will be analyzing the policy, legal,
economic and social questions raised by these (and other) proceedings as
the electric industry is restructured. I invite you to evaluate these questions

31. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. FERC, 754 F.2d 1378,1380 (1985).
32. We have, however, seen that Munis are aware of this risk and have sought to preclude
retail access on their own systems while seeking the benefits of wholesale competition. See, e.g.,
PublicPower Weekly, No. 96-23, p. 1-2 Oune 17,1996) ("Braintree [Mass.] finds a way to put a
hold on retail wheeling").

33. With respect to the recovery of stranded costs, the DraftPlanforElectric UtilityIndustry

Restructuring,Maine Public Utilities Commission Dkt. No. 95-462 (issued July 19,1996), cites
the United States Supreme Court's decision United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S.Ct. 2432
(1996) (finding that federal savings and loan associations adversely affected by changes in
regulation were entitled to compensation), for the principle the "government should act
responsibility in changing the rules of the game."' Id., at 35 n.17. While I take issue with some
of the Maine Commission's analysis, Iwould agree that the Winstar decision establishes that
regulated firms are to be compensated (by either ratepayers or taxpayers) when the "rules of
the game" are changed in a manner that adversely affects the regulated firm's ability to recover
investment reasonably and prudently made.
34. Two of these cases were decided between the date of the Symposium and the
publication of this volume. Suffolk County Electrica Agency, 77 F.E.R.C. 1161,355 (1996) (ordering
IOU to provide wholesale transmission to Muni, only to extent necessary to accommodate
Muni's customers as of date of passage of EPAct, because Muni was "providing electric
service" prior to the effective date of the EPAct, but no new customers must be provided
service, as Suffolk does not own or control any transmission or distribution facilities); City of
Palm Springs, Ca., 76 F.E.R.C. 161,127 (1996) (denying Muni's application to require IOU to
provide transmission services on grounds that Muni did not own or control all transmission
and distribution facilities). The remaining two cases are pending.
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in light of the legal, political and economic circumstances under which the
electric industry has developed.

